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PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS FOR CONTINUATION
OF AN ENTERPRISE AFTER THE DEATH
OF A PARTNER
By WARNER FULLER"
UNMISTAKABLE signs of expanded use of the partnership device have
recently made their appearance in the field of small enterprise. This
renewed interest is clearly attributable to the fact that the costs of doing
business frequently are less where this time-honored business unit is used
in place of the heretofore more popular corporation. In recent years,
the latter has been a favorite source of revenue for constantly mounting
costs of government. And as corporate taxes rose without corresponding
increases being levied against those using the partnership, the time came
when the incentive was strong to re-evaluate the comparative advantages
of the two business institutions.' Where the small enterprise has been
concerned, the decision has, with increasing frequency, been rendered
in favor of the partnership.
Increased use of the partnership makes it probable that in the future
greater attention will be paid to the possibility of eliminating or min-
imizing important disadvantages usually regarded as necessarily incident
to the partnership. The natural objective of these efforts will be to obtain
for the partnership as many as possible of the advantages of incorpora-
tion without actual incorporation. One great corporate advantage not
possessed by the partnership is that of so-called "immortality." The legal
existence of the corporation is unaffected by the death of one or more
of its members. On the other hand, the death of a partner is said to
effect a dissolution of the partnership,2 and, as a general rule, to cause
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1. The appalling complexity and infinite variations of federal and state tax laws,
together with the influence of the financial set-ups of particular enterprises and their
owners on the amount of tax liability, make impossible any accurate statement covering
the tax advantage of the partnership over the corporation. It can safely be said, how-
ever, that in a large number of situations a very considerable advantage may be found.
See Comment (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 506. It has been broadly estimated that closely
owned corporations operating in Illinois would save approximately one-half of their taxes
by a shift to a partnership form. Metzdorf, A "Pardner" or Incorporation (1940) 37
COMMERCE 16.
2. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP (1938) 333. A number of states have statutes authorizing
the continuance of a decedent's business by his executor or administrator. Adelman, The
Power to Carry on the Business of a Decedent (1937) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 185, 195. They
do not, however, authorize the personal representative to continue the enterprise in part-
nership with the surviving partner. Altgelt v. Sullivan & Co., 79 S. W. 333 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1903) ; Altgelt v. Alamo Nat. Bank, 98 Tex. 252, 83 S. W. 6 (1904).
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a sudden and enforced liquidation of the business' which can rarely be
consummated without substantial losses both to the survivor and to the
decedent's estate.' The toll is likely to be especially great, for example,
where the venture is one having a valuable good will, or assets such as
buildings, inventories, fixtures, and expensive mechanical equipment which
are not ordinarily susceptible of advantageous sale on quick liquidation.
The utility of the partnership as a business device will be greatly in-
creased if the unfortunate consequences of a partner's death can be over-
come or substantially minimized. Attempts to achieve this end have taken
several forms. One scheme has been for one or more of the partners
to authorize continuance of the business by testamentary direction.' This
arrangement may be satisfactory where the terms of the will are agree-
able to the survivor. But since the provisions are not binding upon him,'
this type of continuation arrangement bears the risk that the survivor
will refuse to continue the enterprise on the specified terms. Another
possible solution is an agreement between the partners providing that
the survivor shall purchase, or have an option to purchase, the decedent's
interest upon the latter's death.7 This scheme will be satisfactory where
the survivor is willing and financially able to assume a definite commit-
ment of purchase. But it will not be useful in those situations where
the survivor is unwilling or unable to assume the purchase obligation
or where the partner desires to assure his beneficiaries of a continued
participation in the profits of the enterprise after his death.
Another plan to minimize the effect of a partner's death provides
for an agreemet authorizing the continuance of the enterprise after a
member's death for the benefit both of the surviving partner or partners 8
3. 1 ROWLEY, PArNEsmp (1916) § 579. A provision in a partnership agreement
that it shall continue for a specified term of years does not authorize the continuance of
the enterprise after the death of a partner. Hoard v. Clum, 31 Minn. 186, 17 N. W.
275 (1883) ; see Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586, 594 (U. S. 1833).
4. After a partner's death, absent an agreement or provision in a will authorizing
a continuance of the enterprise, there can be but limited continuance for the purpose of
winding up. 2 Row.EY, PARTNERSHIP (1916) § 615. The continuance for this purpose
does not in most cases provide a fully satisfactory method of liquidation. See Adelman,
The Power to Carry on the Btusness of a Decedent (1937) 36 NMicr. L. REv. 185, 186.
5. See Burwell v. Mandeville's F_'r, 2 How. 560 (U. S. 1844) ; Jones v. Walker,
103 U. S. 444 (1880); Roessler's Estate, 5 Pa. Dist. 776 (1896).
6. Mamaux's Estate, 274 Pa. 533, 103 Ad. 892 (1922); Slater v. Slater, 203 App.
Div. 567, 572, 204 N. Y. Supp. 112, 116 (1st Dep't 1924).
7. See Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N. E. 466 (1914); McKinnon v.
McKinnon, 56 Fed. 409 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893) ; Harbster's Appeal, 125 Pa. 1, 17 Ad. 204
(1889). Such arrangements may involve leaving decedent's capital in the business in
the form of a loan.
8. In order to avoid repetition of the phrase "surviving partner or partners," "sur-
viving partner" will be used as indicating the plural unless the context indicates that a
single survivor is meant.
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and the decedent's estate or other persons named by the decedent partner.'
This arrangement not only averts sudden liquidation of the business,
but also enables the associates to provide for continued payment of the
enterprise's profits to their beneficiaries. These rather obvious advan-
tages make it natural to expect that the use of this type of arrangement
will increase unless it runs up against legal or practical disadvantages."
The last-mentioned type of continuation arrangement must be varied
to meet the particular requirements of specific situations. Where the
business is one in which either partner is willing and able to continue
in active charge after the other's death, and other considerations do not
require the introduction of a third person to succeed to the decedent's
place, the simplest plan is to have the survivor" continue the enterprise,
operating it on an agreed basis jointly for himself and for the decedent's
beneficiaries.' 2 Where, however, only one of the partners is competent
to manage the business, the situation seems to call for an arrangement
permitting continuation of the enterprise only if the competent partner
9. Such agreements usually provide that the beneficiaries shall be designated by
will or other written instrument. Another arrangement is one in which the survivor has
the option of paying a specified proportion of the profits or an annuity of a prescribed
amount. See Ex parte Harper, 1 DeG. & J. 180 (1857).
10. Whether arrangements of this type give rise to an "association," as distinguished
from a partnership, presents an important tax problem. The income of an "association"
is taxed under federal income tax statutes in the same way as a corporation, whereas
partnership income is regarded as the personal income of the partners. 4 PAUL & Mat-
TENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (1934) 228 et seq. It °seems to have been
assumed that a partnership and not an "association" exists where the members operate
their business along orthodox partnership lines, although they may have agreed that the
enterprise should be continued to the end of the agreed term, despite the earlier death
of a member. James Brown, 10 B. T. A. 1036 (1928). It is improbable that the courts
will reach a contrary result. See 4 PAUL & MaNRTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IxcoME TAX-
ATION (1934) 250, 252; Wood v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 733 (E. D. Pa. 1931);
IX-1 CumI. BULL. 219. But see 111-2 Cum. BULL 1. Even if such an arrangement should
be treated as an "association," appreciable tax savings over the corporate form can still
be afforded through the elimination of state incorporation, annual franchise and capital
stock taxes, and federal taxes such as initial and transfer taxes on share certificates and
old age taxes. 49 STAT. 636 (1939), 42 U. S. C. § 1004 (1935 Supp.). Savings may also
be effected through elimination of clerical and attorney's costs incident to the prepara-
tion and filing of the numerous corporate reports required not only in connection with
the foregoing taxes but also in other miscellaneous corporate matters, such as annual
reports concerning the corporation's financial status (required in some states). See
United Oil Co. v. Eager Transp. Co., 273 Mass. 375, 173 N. E. 692 (1930).
11. Sometimes an option to decide Whether the business shall be continued is given to
the surviving partner. In re Borden's Estate, 95 Misc. 443, 159 N. Y. Supp. 346 (Surr. Ct.
1916). At other times it is given to the decedent partner's beneficiary. Jacquin v.
Buisson, 11 How. Pr. 385 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1878) (although arrangement held invalid,
it clearly would be upheld elsewhere. See p. 206 infra).
12. An arrangement found in Bell v. Hepworth, 134 N. Y. 442, 31 N. E. 918 (1892)
and Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222, 46 At. 257 (1900).
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should be the survivor.'3 On the other hand, if either partner has a
wife,- son,'5 relative, or other person whom he desires to succeed to
his interest after his death, for the purpose either of safeguarding the
interests of his estate or of providing a business career for a beneficiary,
the arrangement is likely to involve the introduction of a successor part-
ner.'6 It is common practice in continuation agreements of the successor
partner type to limit the range of selection of successors to persons or
classes of persons agreed upon in advance, such as named executors,
sons, or relatives, possessing good moral character.'- These precautions
are essential as a practical matter because of the extremely broad powers
which partners possess to subject their associates to unlimited personal
liability. Continuation agreements of the kind under consideration gener-
ally provide that the venture shall continue either for the term prescribed
in the original partnership or for some stipulated period following the
death of a partner.' 8
VALIDITY OF CONTINUATION AGREEMENTS 10
A. Where enterprise is to be continued by sur-viving partner -without
the introduction of a successor partner to replace decedent. An agree-
13. This type of agreement is seen in Gratz v. Bayard, 11 S. & R. 41 (Pa. 1824)
and Ponton v. Dunn, 1 Russ. & M. 402 (1830).
14. See Balmain v. Shore, 9 Ves. 500 (1804) (agreement that partner's interest
should, upon his death, go to his widow for life and, after her decease, equally to his
children, held not to constitute settlement on children predeceasing widow).
15. If the son is a minor, provision is sometimes made for the appointment of an
adult to assist in the business until the beneficiary attains his majority. Pemberton v.
Oakes, 4 Russ. 154 (1827). See 2 Rowx.Ev, PARTxERSIHp (1916) § 1160 for a suggested
form of agreement covering this situation. See also Wainwright v. Waterman, I Ves.
211 (1791) for the consequences flowing from the failure of a decedent partner's execu-
tors to designate a successor partner under the provisions of a continuation agreement.
16. In all these situations, the advisability should be considered of including a pro-
vision in the continuation agreement permitting the admission of new or the retirement
of old partners. In the absence of such permission, a change in the membership may
be held to revoke the decedent's consent to a continuation of the enterprise. See Smith
v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320 (1879).
17. See, for example, Madg-wick v. Wimble, 6 Beav. 495 (1843). A provision that
the executor of the decedents estate shall become a partner in decedent's place is also
common.
18. See, for example, Bell v. Hepworth, 134 N. Y. 442, 31 N. E. 918 (1892) (five
years).
19. An agreement of continuance will not be presumed. See Scholefield v. Eichel-
berger, 7 Pet. 586, 594 (U. S. 1833); Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 573
(U. S. 1844) ; Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 336, 31 Ad. 100S, 1031 (1S95). Where
it is doubtful whether an agreement of partnership contemplates continuation of the
business, the question is for the jury. MeNeish v. U. S. Hulless Oats Co., 57 Vt. 316
(1884); cf. Alexander's Ex'rs v. Lewis, 47 Tex. 481, 487 (1877).
The surviving partner is, of course, limited in his activities to the scope of the
original enterprise. See National Bank of Newburgh v. Bigler, 83 N. Y. 51, 57 (1830);
19401
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ment for the continuation of an enterprise after the death of a partner
is valid on ordinary contract principles." It is binding upon the sur-
viving partner, whose failure to abide by its terms will subject him to
an action for damages for breach of contract.2 This result seems proper
not only on a contract basis, but also in the light of an obviously sound
economic policy which has as its objective the minimization or avoidance
of the severe business losses which frequently attend the death of a
partner.
It is unlikely that the courts will decree specific performance of con-
tinuation agreements. Equity ordinarily will not specifically enforce
contracts which involve the exercise of special skills and judgment, or
demand constant supervision by the courts.2 If continuation of the
cf. Berry v. Folkes, 60 Miss. 576 (1882). His authority to act seems to terminate at the
end of the prescribed term of continuance. Cf. Steiner & Lobman v. Steiner Land &
Lumber Co., 120 Ala. 128, 144, 26 So. 494, 498 (1897). It is suggested in Lincoln v.
Orthwein, 120 Fed. 880, 885 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903) that if a surviving partner enters into
a contract which extends beyond the time specified for continuing the business, the de-
cedent's estate is, upon a breach of the contract, liable only for such damages as accrued
prior to the expiration of the term of continuance.
20. Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 Ati. 675 (1923). See Wild v. Davenport,
48 N. J. L. 129, 136, 7 AtI. 295, 299 (1886); Leaf's Appeal, 105 Pa. 505, 513 (1884);
Vincent v. Martin, 79 Ala. 540, 545 (1885); 2 RowLEv, PARTNERSHIP (1916) § 638;
STORY, PARTNERSHIP (6th ed. 1868) § 199.
The validity of such agreements may not be free from doubt in New York. See
Jacquin v. Buisson, 11 How. Pr. 385 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1878); Bell v. Hepworth, 134
N. Y. 442, 31 N. E. 918 (1892); Nat. Bank of Newburgh v. Bigler, 83 N. Y. 51, 57
(1880). See also Hart & Co. v. Anger & Nicol, 38 La. Ann. 341 (1886); Louisiana Bank
v. Kenner's Succession, 1 La. 384 (1830).
It has been urged that continuation arrangements of the type under consideration
are violative of the Statute of Wills. Bell v. Hepworth, snpra at 447. No cases have
been found, however, which invalidated such agreements on this ground, and this con-
tention was rejected in a well-considered case involving an agreement for purchase of a
decedent's interest by a surviving partner. McKinnon v. McKinnon, 56 Fed. 409 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1893); Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N. E. 466 (1914). Contra: Fer-
rara v. Russo, 40 R. I. 533, 102 Ati. 86 (1917).
21. See Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare 418, 441 (1848) ; Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L.
129, 137, 7 Atl. 295, 298 (1886); Stearns v. Brookline, 219 Mass. 238, 240, 107 N. E.
57, 58 (1914) ; 2 RoWLEY, PARTNERSHIP (1916) § 638. Authority for the basis of ascer-
taining such damages seems completely absent. A persuasive analogy, though, is afforded
by cases involving actions among living partners for damages for wrongful termination
of a partnership prior to the expiration of the agreed term. The problem of computing
damages for breach of post-mortem continuation agreements would seem to be no more
difficult than in this situation, despite the fact that in the continuation agreement situa-
tion one of the partners is dead and can no longer be considered a factor in the business.
See, in particular, Crittenden v. Johnston, 7 App. Div. 258, 40 N. Y. S. 87 (1st Dep't
1896); Treat v. Hiles, 81 Wis. 280, 50 N. W. 896 (1892); cf. Ramsay v. Meade, 37
Colo. 465, 86 Pac. 1018 (1906). But see Webster v. Beau, 77 Wash. 444, 137 Pac. 1013
(1914).
22. The reasons which have been advanced for denying specific performance of a
partnership agreement among living partners seem to apply with equal force to the situa-
[ Vol. SO: 202
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business should become impractical for any reason, continued perform-
ance on the part of the survivor probably would be excused on the theory
that the presumed intent of the parties would be to wind up the enter-
prise in such circumstances even though the prescribed term had not
yet expired.'a
Agreements of this sort are likewise binding upon the decedent's
estate24 and upon the personal creditors of the deceased partner.2m  Any
material violation of the agreement by the estate will subject it to a claim
for damages by the survivor.20 Agreements which contemplate that the
survivor alone will continue the enterprise usually provide that the dece-
dent member's interest in the enterprise shall be left in the business until
the expiration of some agreed period of time.2 Opinion appears to differ
as to whether the estate possesses the power (as distinguished from the
privilege) of withdrawing this interest through a court action for com-
pulsory winding up of the business. Some authorities seem to indicate
that the estate has neither the power nor the privilege of withdrawing
the decedent's interest where the business is to be carried on alone by
tion where a surviving partner is unwilling to continue the business after the death of
his associate. It has been said with respect to the former situation that equity will not
enforce a contract requiring the exercise of the business skill mad judgment so char-
acteristic of the partnership relation. See Buck v. Smith, 29 Mlich. 166, 171 (1874);
Clark v. Truitt, 183 Ill. 239, 245, 55 N. E. 683, 685 (1899) ; 5 Pomnm-oy, Egurv Juass-
PRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) 4898. Some states deny specific performance of an agreement
contemplating the existence of a partnership over a designated period of years because
its enforcement would require continuous court supervision during the life of the agree-
ment. 5 PomERoY, EQUIT, JUR sPRUDEN c (4th ed. 1918) 4898. But see Jones v. Parker,
163 Mass. 564, 40 N. E. 1044 (1895). The usual contention concerning the adequacy of
the legal remedy doubtless also would be invoked to defeat a suit of this type.
23. See In re Clift's Estate, 135 Misc. 4, 10 (1929), 237 N. Y. Supp. 635, 643; cf.
LmNDrxY, PA .Rl.sHip (10th ed. 1935) 677.
24. Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222, 46 At. 257 (1900) ; cf. Gerding v. Baier, 143
Md. 520, 122 At. 675 (1923). See also Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 561
(U. S. 1844) ; Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 137, 7 At. 295, 299 (1886) ; Sterns
v. Brookline, 219 Mass. 238, 240, 107 N. E. 57, 58 (1914). But see Buckingham v. Mor-
rison, 136 111. 437, 454, 27 N. E. 65, 68 (1891) (suggestion that agreement does not bind
decedent's heirs); Laughlin v. Lorenz, 48 Pa. 275, 282 (1864) (suggestion that agree-
ment binds the estate only if executor consents).
25. Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222, 46 AtI. 257 (1900). This result seems sound.
The deceased partner in these circumstances has contracted that his financial interest
shall be left in the partnership for an agreed term. His creditors may, of course, prove
their claims against his estate, and his interest in the partnership could, as a part of
his estate, presumably be subject to the payment of such claims. See Bell v. Hepworth,
134 N. Y. 442, 448, 31 N. E. 918, 921 (1892).
26. See Stems v. Brookline, 219 Mass. 238, 240, 107 N. E. 57, 58 (1914) ; Wild v.
Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 137, 7 Atl. 295, 299 (1886).
27. This situation must be carefully distinguished from that in which the continua-
tion agreement contemplates that decedent's executor or other designated person shall
succeed to the decedent as successor partner. See p. 209 in fra.
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the survivor of two partners.2 Others seem to suggest that the estate
may demand a winding up of the business, although such a move would
subject it to an action for damages on the part of the survivor.2D
If withdrawal is not permitted, the result is tantamount to specific
performance of the estate's part of the agreement. This would seem
to be the sounder result. The usual argument against specifically enforc-
ing partnership contracts is that it is undesirable to coerce persons into
the continuation of complex and confidential relationships where, as in
the partnership, the associates possess such wide powers to subject each
other to formidable personal liability." This argument has little, if any,
application to the situation under consideration. There is no opportunity
for disagreement as to the control of the business, as that is vested in
the survivor by agreement, and no personal liability falls on unwilling
shoulders, since neither the decedent's executors nor his heirs become
liable for the debts of the continued business.3 ' Furthermore, where the
surviving partner is willing to carry out the arrangement, no burden
of continued supervision is imposed upon the courts. This result, which
strengthens continuation agreements by preventing the estate from
breaching the partnership contract, has the additional advantage of en-
abling men to plan for the future with confidence that their wishes will
be carried out.
The estate will doubtless be excused from proceeding under a con-
tinuation agreement in instances where the survivor is guilty of mis-
conduct in the management of the enterprise,8 2 or where the agreement
for continuance is so indefinite as to make it impossible to ascertain its
material terms, such as the amount of capital to be left in the business.8
B. Where continuation agreement contemplates that a successor part-
ner will take place of decedent member. A continuation agreement may
28. See Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 335, 31 Atl. 1080, 1081 (1895) ; cf. Bur-
well v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 576 (U. S. 1844) ; Lincoln v. Orthwein, 120 Fed.
880, 883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903); Owens v. Mackall, 33 Md. 382, 396 (1870). Although
these cases, with the exception of Wilcox v. Derickson, .supra, involve situations in which
the business was continued pursuant to testamentary direction rather than by contractual
arrangement, they afford support for the statement, because the case for requiring a de-
cedent's capital to be left in the business is obviously stronger where provided for by
contract than where the testator has merely directed a continuance by will.
29. See Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 137, 7 Atl. 295, 300 (1886).
30. 2 ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP (1916) § 778.
31. Compare this result with that where it is contemplated that a successor partner
shall be introduced into the business but where the named person refuses to act. See p.
209 infra.
32. Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kan. 119, 105 Pac. 502 (1909).
33. This is on the basis that a contract does not become legally binding where a
material term is so indefinite as to make it impossible to ascertain the intention of the
parties. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACrs (rev. ed. 1936) § 37; cf. Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare
418 (1848).
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differ from the type just considered in that it may contemplate the intro-
duction into the enterprise of a successor partner to replace the decedent
member. Where this plan is adopted, it is commonly provided that the
new or successor partner shall be the decedent's personal representative,
perhaps his widow, son, or other relative, and that the successor partner
shall carry on the business with the survivor for the benefit of the
decedent's estate. Such agreements commonly provide that each of the
original partners shall have the duty or option of nominating a successor
before his death.3" If a partner dies and the nomination has been properly
made, the nominee has a reasonable time to look into the affairs of the
partnership and to decide whether he will become a partner."m If a nom-
ination is made in accordance with the terms of the agreement" and
both the nominee and the surviving partner are willing to continue the
business, they will be permitted to do so over the objection of the dece-
dent's heirs."7 The surviving partner may, however, be unwilling to
continue the enterprise. If he refuses to abide by his contract, he becomes
subject to damages for breach of contract, s but he cannot and should
not be coerced into carrying on the business in partnership with the person
designated. The same reasons which preclude specific performance of
the ordinary partnership contract among living partners are plainly appli-
cable here.39 The consequence of the refusal of a surviving partner to
continue the business will be liquidation. 4
0
It may happen, of course, that the party who refuses to continue the
business is the person who has been designated as the successor partner.
If the agreement is one which expressly names the successor partner
or which imposes a duty on a partner to nominate a successor in his
34. Where such nomination is actually made prior to the death of a partner, it
would seem that the nominee gets no such interest in the business as would prevent the
original partners from thereafter dissolving the partnership. Ehrmann v. Ehrmann, 72
L. T. 17 (1895).
35. Pigott v. Bagley, M1'Clel. & Y. 569 (1825); Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L
129, 7 Atl. 295 (1886). But the nominee cannot require a partnership accounting. Pigott
v. Bagley, supra.
36. Holland v. King, 6 C. B. 727 (1848); cf. Evans v. Watts, 192 Pa. 112, 43 Atl.
464 (1899).
See Ponton v. Dunn, 1 Russ. & M. 402 (1830) as to the consequence of a deceased
partner's failure to name the beneficiary of the continued business.
37. In re Marx's Estate, 106 App. Div. 212, 94 N. Y. Supp. 151 (2d Dep't 1905).
Vhen the nomination is agreed to by the nominee, the nominee is said to become a part-
ner and as such becomes entitled to the incidents of that status; cf. Byrne v. Reid, (1902]
2 Ch. 735; see also Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare 418 (1848).
38. See Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L 129, 137, 7 Ad. 295, 299 (1886) ; Downs v.
Collins, 6 Hare 418, 441 (1848). See also notes 20 and 21 supra.
39. See Byrne v. Reid, [1902] 2 Ch. 735, 743; see also note 22 supra.
40. See note 43 infra, where the nominee's refusal to continue resulted in liquidation
of the business. The result would seem to be the same where it is the survivor who
refuses to carry on the enterprise.
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
lifetime, the nominee's failure to consent to become a successor partner
will subject the decedent's estate to an action for damages for breach
of contract." This is because the decedent agreed that his nominee would
continue the business in partnership with the survivor, and this agreement
has not been kept. But the nominee would not be required specifically
to perform the agreement. Ordinarily he is not a party to the contin-
uation arrangement, and the hazards of the partnership status are such
that they will not be imposed upon one who has not agreed to become
a partner and who is unwilling to do so.42 And where the nominee
refuses to carry on the business, the survivor has no right to require
that the decedent's interest be left in the enterprise. A contrary result
would be improper because the decedent partner may reasonably be sup-
posed to have intended that the business would be continued by two
persons acting in concert and not by one alone. He might well have been
unwilling to entrust the enterprise to the sole management of his sur-
viving partner. Winding up of the business will therefore be the con-
sequence of the nominee's refusal to abide by the terms of the agree-
ment.
LIABILITIES ARISING FROM A CONTINUATION OF TiiE ENTERPRISE
A. Insulation of decedent partner's general estate from liabilities of
continued business. The extent to which agreements for the continuation
of a business after the death of a partner may subject a decedent partner's
general estate to future risks has an important bearing upon the practical
utility of such arrangements. If a continuation of the enterprise for the
benefit of the decedent's estate were automatically to subject the entire
estate to liability for partnership debts incurred after the partner's death,
this disadvantageous consequence of the arrangement might be sufficient
to outweigh its virtues. If, on the other hand, the extent of the liability
of the decedent's estate should be subject to adequate control, the desir-
ability and practicability of the continuation agreement would be greatly
increased.
The decisions reveal that the courts have looked benignly upon part-
nership agreements for continuation of the enterprise for the benefit of
a decedent partner's estate and that they have gone far to assure the
realization of the advantages which have been sought. The prevailing
view is that partners may arrange to have their enterprise continued after
41. See Lancaster v. Allsup, 57 L. T. 53, 54 (Ch. D. 1887); Downs v. Collins, 6
Hare 418 (1848) ; Phillips v. "Blatcbford, 137 Mass. 510, 515 (1884).
42. Lancaster v. Allsup, 57 L. T. 53 (Ch. D. 1887). See Wild v. Davenport, 48 N.
J. L. 129, 136, 7 Atl. 295, 299 (1886) ; Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare 418, 438 (1848) ; Edgar
v. Cook, 4 Ala. 588, 590 (1843).
43. Lancaster v. Allsup, 57 L. T. 53 (Ch. D. 1887); Kershaw v. Matthews, 2 Russ.
62 (1826) ; Downs v. Collins, 6 Hare 418 (1848).
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the death of a member without subjecting the decedent's general estate
to claims of subsequent creditors. The extent to which the latter's general
estate will become liable to such creditors is subject to control. The
partners may arrange, for example, that the property of a deceased mem-
ber which is to remain subject to the risks of the business shall be limited
either to the decedent's interest in the business as it existed at the time
of his death" or to such greater or lesser amount as may be agreed
upon.4" The former is probably the more common type of arrangement.
It is said that the general estate40 may be insulated against future risks
because the rights of subsequent creditors are controlled by the terms
of the agreement of continuance and not by common-law principles of
partnership. If the agreement contemplates that the rights of subsequent
creditors shall be confined to the assets of the continued firm insofar
as the decedent's estate is concerned, this intention forms the measure
and extent of their rights .4  Third persons dealing with the continued
enterprise are therefore bound to inquire as to the extent of the authority
conferred by the continuation agreement; otherwise they extend credit
at their own risk.49
44. Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 31 At. 1080 (1895); Stewart v. Robinson,
115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. 160 (1889) (the receipt of profits of continued business by es-
tate did not make it liable as partner or otherwise) ; Labouchere v. Tupper, xi Moore
P.C.C. 198 (1857) ; Cook v. Adm'r of Rogers, 3 Fed. 69 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1880). But
see Blodgett v. American Nat. Bank, 49 Conn. 9, 26 (1881); Kottxwitz v. Alexander's
Ex'r, 34 Tex. 688 (1869). In Jones v. Walker, 103 U. S. 444, 446 (1880) (continuation
under will) the Court suggested that if any of the corpus of the partnership estate is
paid to a beneficiary, creditors would be able to recover against the recipient to the ex-
tent of the payment. This seems clearly correct, as the corpus of capital left in the busi-
ness can be regarded as charged with the debts of the continuing enterprise. Non-liability
on the part of decedent's general estate has also resulted where the enterprise was con-
tinued under testamentary authority of the deceased partner. Jones v. Walker, supra;
Hagan v. Barksdale, 44 Miss. 186 (1870) (individual); Roessler's Estate, 5 Pa. Dist.
776 (1896); Smith v. Ayer, 101 U. S. 320 (1879) ; Brasfield v. French, 59 'Miss. 632
(1882); Cutbush v. Cutbush, 1 Beav. 184 (1739); Ex parte Richardson, 3 Madd. 138
(1818) (sole trader); Ex parte Garland, 10 Ves. 110 (1804) (individual). See Steiner
& Lobman v. Steiner Land & Lumber Co., 120 Ala. 128, 144, 26 So. 494, 498 (1897).
But see Eisenstadt Jewelry Co. v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 72 'Mo. App. 514 (1897).
45. See Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 576 (U. S. 1844); Huber v.
Wood, 14 Pa. C. C. 13, 18 (1894). Authority to increase the amount of capital in a con-
tinued enterprise, which is conferred upon a person who declines to act as executor,
cannot be exercised by the administrator cum tcstamento annexo. Cf. Cutbush v. Cut-
bush, 1 Beav. 184 (1739).
46. The term "general estate" is used here to describe that portion of a partner's
assets which is exclusive of his interest in the partnership.
47. See Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 338, 31 Atl. 1080, 1082 (1895).
48. See cases cited note 44 supra.
49. Compare Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 576 (U. S. 1844); Hagan
v. Barksdale, 44 Miss. 186, 191 (1870). This accords with the general rule that a part-
ner's death gives notice to the world of the dissolution of the firm. 1 Rovx'E, PAISm'zh-
sHiP (1916) § 594. It is apparently immaterial that the business is conducted without a
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Subsequent creditors may, however, charge a decedent partner's general
estate with their claims when this was intended by the continuation agree-
ment." But the intention must be clearly shown,"' and doubts in this
connection are not likely to be resolved in behalf of creditors who are
usually favored in other situations. It seems safe to say that in most
jurisdictions the general estate will not be bound in the absence of express
declaration of an intention to bind the estate.
The lengths to which the courts will go in protecting the decedent's
estate, even where the justification is slight, is illustrated by Stewart v.
Robinson. 2 This case held that a continuation agreement, which pro-
vided that a decedent partner's estate should bear the same share of
business losses as the decedent assumed during his lifetime, manifested
no intention to subject the latter's general estate to the claims of sub-
sequent creditors. An interpretation of this language which seems more
natural leads to an opposite conclusion. 3 The court's rather astonishing
conclusion was reached on the theory that the language of the agree-
ment manifested no clearly defined intention to subject the general estate
to claims of subsequent creditors, and that a decision holding the general
estate liable would cause serious inconvenience and hardship because of
the practical necessity or desirability of postponing the distribution of
the estate until all debts of the continued business were paid. 4 A dece-
change in name. Stewart v. Robinson, 115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. 160 (1889); Wilcox v.
Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 31 AtI. 1080 (1895). Some jurisdictions assert, however, that
death of a partner does not necessarily dissolve the partnership. See note 98 infra. If
this view were carried to its logical conclusion, death of a partner would not operate to
give notice of dissolution.
50. Compare Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11, 33 (Va. 1859); Gibson v. Stevens,
7 N. H. 352, 356 (1834) ; see Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 336, 31 At. 1080, 1081
(1895). In Blodgett v. American Nat. Bank, 49 Conn. 9, 26 (1881) it is said that the
decedent's estate is liable for subsequent debts without regard to the decedent's intention.
A provision in a continuation agreement that subsequent partnership debts are to be paid
out of the assets of the continued venture has been held inconsistent with an intention
to bind the decedent's general estate. See Hagan v. Barksdale, 44 Miss. 186, 194 (1870) ;
cf. Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y. 586, 590, 21 N. E. 705, 706 (1889) ; Brasfield v. French,
59 Miss. 632, 637 (1882); Ferris v. Van Ingen & Co., 110 Ga. 102, 108, 35 S. E. 347,
350 (1899) ; cf. Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510, 514 (1884).
51. See Stewart v. Robinson, 115 N. Y. 328, 335, 22 N. E. 160, 161 (1889) ; cf, Fer-
ris v. Van Ingen & Co., 110 Ga. 102, 108, 35 S. E. 347, 350 (1899) ; Roessler's Estate,
5 Pa. Dist. 776, 778 (1896); Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r. 2 How. 560, 577 (U. S.
1844).
52. 115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. 160 (1889) ; cf. M'Neillie v. Acton, 4 De G. M. & G.
744 (1853) ; Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560 (U. S. 1844). But see Ussery v.
Crusman, 47 S. W. 567 (Tenn. 1898).
53. This apparently was the view entertained by the court in Alexander's Ex'rs v.,
Lewis, 47 Tex. 481 (1877).
54. See Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 337, 31 At. 1080, 1081 (1895) ; Ex parte
Garland, 10 Ves. 110, 119 (1804) ; Burwell v. Mandeville's Ex'r, 2 I-low. 560, 577 (U. S.
1844) ; M'Neillie v. Acton, 4 De G. M. & G. 744, 753 (1853) ; Roessler's Estate, 5 Pa.
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dent, the court held, ordinarily would not be deemed to intend such a
consequence in the absence of a clearly indicated intention to that effect.*
The opposite conclusion could have been reached on the theory that
it would be unreasonable to believe that a surviving partner, in the absence
of clear language to the contrary, would agree to carry on the business
and divide the profits with decedent's estate unless the latter were to
assume its share of any loss suffered. It may be conceded, though, that
the court's argument has considerable force where the language of the
continuation agreement is arbiguous or where the period for which the
business is to be continued extends beyond a reasonable period of time
for the distribution of a decedent partner's general estate. But the argu-
ment has not been confined to such situations; it has not only been used
where the language of the agreement gave little room for interpreta-
tion56 but also where the unexpired term was of such short duration as
not to require undue postponement of distribution of the estate." The
result reached in Stewart v. Robhson is open to the further criticism
that persons extending credit to the continued enterprise are likely to
be misled. They would naturally assume that the terms of the continua-
tion agreement bound the decedent's general estate for the debts of the
enterprise.
The courts' tendency to resort to strained and artificial reasoning in
order to insulate the general estate from subsequent risks of the business
may be observed in another connection. It has been noted already that
the arrangement may be one which contemplates continuation of the
business by the survivor alone. It has been urged in these circumstances
that a deceased partner could not have intended that his entire estate
should become subject to the liabilities of the continued business venture
because no right of control over the business was reserved to his exec-
utors."' Such an argument obviously is not of general validity. The
duties of an executor frequently do not require the exercise of any cun-
siderable degree of business judgment. On the other hand, the high
degree of confidence which one partner necessarily reposes in the business
judgment of an associate who is to have sole control of the business
after his death makes it not at all unnatural that he should, at least in
Dist. 776, 777 (1896). If distribution of the estate were not held up, equal if not greater
hardship would result if recipients of the estate were required many years later to yield
their shares to creditors; cf. Roessler's Estate, supra at 777; Ex parte Garland, supra
at 119.
55. See Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 31 Ad. 1080 (1896); cf. Burwell v. Man-
deville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 577 (U. S. 1844).
56. Compare Burwell v. Mandeville's E.x'r, 2 How. 560 (U. S. 1844).
57. Ibid. (continuation authorized by will; authority for continuance had one year
and two months to run).
58. See Burwell v. Mlandeville's Ex'r, 2 How. 560, 580 (U. S. 1844) (continuation
authorized by will).
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some instances, repose greater confidence in him than in one whom he
might name as his executor.
B. Liability of the survivor, decedent's personal representative, and
heirs where the business is continued by survivor alone. A surviving
partner who, pursuant to the terms of a continuation agreement, carries
on the business after the death of an associate is personally responsible
not only for obligations arising prior to his associate's death, but also
for the debts which are incurred thereafter " His liability for the sub-
sequent debts is that of a principal, but he is entitled to exoneration where
he pays more than his share of the business debts. The amount of exon-
eration to which he is entitled is limited by the terms of the continua-
tion agreement. If the agreement contemplates that his right of exon-
eration shall be limited to the interest of the decedent remaining in the
continued enterprise, this intention is controlling."0 But if it contem-
plates that the general estate of the decedent shall be responsible for the
debts of the continued business, then the right of exoneration extends
to the general estate.6 '
As neither the decedent's executors 2 nor his legatees"3 become partners
in the continued enterprise where the agreement for continuation pro-
vides that the business shall be carried on by the survivor alone, they
59. Tenney, Ballister & Co. v. New England Prot. Union, 37 Vt. 64 (1864); cf.
Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. 307 (1828).
60. See Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 137, 7 Atd. 295, 299 (1886) ; cl. Pitkin v.
Pitkin, 7 Conn. 307 (1828) ; Huber v. Wood, 14 Pa. C. C. 13 (1894). Danger exists, ill tile
absence of a clear-cut provision to the contrary, that if the resources of the continued
enterprise are not sufficient to pay creditors and the survivor is required to make good
a deficiency out of his own pocket, a covenant will be implied on the part of the estate
to reimburse the survivor for the amount paid in excess of the latter's pro rata share.
Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510 (1884).
61. Phillips v. Blatchford, 137 Mass. 510 (1884). Cf. Huber v. Wood, 14 Pa. C. C.
13 (1894).
62. Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373
(1870); Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 7 Atd. 295 (1886) ; Cf. Stewart v. Robin-
son, 115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. 160 (1889). But in Edgar v. Cook, 4 Ala. 588, 590 (1843)
it is suggested that an executor becomes a partner merely by leaving assets of the de-
cedent in the business. Accord, Holme v. Hammond, 7 Exch. 218 (1872). But see Ex
parte Garland, 10 Ves. 110, 121-122 (1804).
63. This follows inevitably from the fact that, absent an intention on the part of
the decedent to bind his general estate, the latter is not liable for subsequent debts of the
enterprise. See p. 210 supra. Protecting the estate against the claims of creditors would
be foolish if the distributees were later on to be held liable. Cf. Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn.
307 (1828). Contra: Nave v. Sturges, 5 Mo. App. 557 (1878). UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT, § 7(4), provides that "The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a busi-
ness is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: . . . (c) as an annuity to a
widow or representative of a deceased partner."
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are therefore not liable either to prior 4 or subsequent creditors."' The
fact that the decedent's interest vests in the executor.. and that the latter
leaves the decedent's interest in the business 7 and receives its profits for
the benefit of the estate does not make him a partner." Nor does he
become a partner through inspecting the books of the business.c9 If.
however, he should through agreement or conduct assume the status
of a partner, he would, of course, become liable as such.7"
C. Liabilities of decedent's executor and other successor partners
where business is conducted jointly by them and survaivor. It has already
been noted that arrangements for continuation of the enterprise after
the death of a partner may contemplate the introduction of a new or
successor member to replace the decedent. The person designated as
successor partner often is the decedent's executor,71 although, of course,
other persons may be named. Although such a successor is not personally
entitled to profits of the continued business, he becomes liable as a partner
to creditors whose claims arise after he has assumed this status. 2 If he
is required to pay any such claims out of his personal assets, he will,
however, be entitled to exoneration to the extent that the decedent's
estate is embarked in the continued enterprise."3 If, on the other hand,
the claims concerned existed at the time of the death of the former
64. Mattison v. Farnham, 44 Minn. 95, 46 N. W. 347 (1890).
65. Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373
(1870) (executors); cf. Owens v. fackmll, 33 Aid. 382 (1870) (executors); Jones v.
Walker, 103 U. S. 444 (1880).
66. See Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331, 339, 31 Ad. 1080, 1082 (1895).
67. Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 7 At. 295 (1886) ; Richter v. Poppenhusen,
39 How. Pr. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373 (1870); cf. Owens v. Madall, 33
Mid. 382 (1870); Bacon v. Pomeroy, 104 Mass. 577 (1870). But see Edgar v. Cook,
4 Ala. 588 (1843).
68. Butcher v. Hepworth, 115 N. Y. 328, 22 N. E. 163 (1889); see also Richter v.
Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373 (1870). Nor does
mere acceptance of profits where the enterprise is continued under the authority of a
will render the recipient liable as partner. Cf. Jones v. Walker, 103 U. S. 444 (1880).
But see Edgar v. Cook, 4 Ala. 588 (1843).
69. Wild v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 7 At. 295 (1886).
70. Edwards v. Thomas, 66 Mo. 468 (1877). This liability attaches because the
executor holds himself out as a partner. See Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 82
(Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373 (1870). The case of the executor is hard, in that
he becomes liable as a partner to the full extent of his personal assets. See Ex parte
Garland, 10 Ves. 110, 119 (1804).
71. Where an executor becomes a partner in a continued enterprise, he acts as a
member of the partnership and not in his capacity as executor. Columbus Watch Co.
v. Hodenpyl, 135 N. Y. 430, 32 N. E. 239 (1892).
72. See Avery & Son v. Meyers, Houseman & Co., 60 Mfiss. 367, 371 (1882) ; Wild
v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 137, 7 Atl. 295, 299 (1886) ; Willis v. Sharp, 113 N. Y.
586, 591, 21 N. E. 705, 706 (1889) ; LIND,=, PARTNERsHIP (10th ed. 1935) 726.
73. See p. 214 supra.
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partner, the latter's successor would not be personally liable in the absence
of evidence of an intention on his part to assume past debts of the
business. 74 Where the agreement for continuance expressly contemplates
that a designated person shall become a partner, less evidence will prob-
ably be required to establish that he has assumed the partnership status
than if no such provision existed. Thus, where an agreement contem-
plated the introduction of decedent's executor as successor partner, the
executor's silence and his failure to withdraw the estate's assets from
the business have been held strong evidence that he had assumed the
partnership status."5 This result seems sound, because under the cir-
cumstances the executor's conduct can be fairly interpreted as mani-
festing his intention to become a partner. If he did not intend to become
a partner, it would have been natural for him so to declare.
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AGAINST ASSETS OF THE CONTINUED ENTERPRISE
A. Where claims are incurred after the death of a partner and the
enterprise is continued by the surviving partner in association zeith a
successor partner.76 The practicability of having a successor partner
continue a business after the death of one partner in the interest of his
beneficiaries is determined to some extent by the court's interpretation
of creditors' rights. If the scheme seriously curtails creditors' rights,
the arrangement will not be satisfactory in those ventures where credit
must be readily available.
Creditors of a firm which is continued pursuant to such an arrange-
ment are, of course, able to hold the surviving partner and the successor
partner personally liable on any obligations which they incur in carrying
on the enterprise. Hence, if the continuation arrangement adversely af-
fects the rights of this type of creditor, it is because it affects his ability
to reach the assets of the continued venture, as distinguished from the
personal assets of those continuing the enterprise. The question of his
ability to reach the assets of the continued business will assume its greatest
importance when the personal resources of the continuing partners are
74. Mattison v. Farnham, 44 Minn. 95, 46 N. W. 347 (1890). The survivor clearly
would be liable for debts incurred in the interval between the death of a member and
the time when the latter's nominee assumed his status as successor partner. It would
seem that the successor partner should not be held liable for such debts in the absence
of a personal agreement of assumption. In the unlikely event that he were held per-
sonally responsible for the intervening debts, he would be entitled to indemnity out of
the part of decedent's estate that was embarked in the enterprise. See p. 214 supra.
75. Morris v. Harrison, Colles 157 (1701) ; STORY, PARTNERSHIP (6th ed. 1868) 337.
76. The rights of creditors of this type against the decedent's estate and the sur-
vivor respectively have been discussed pp. 210-215 supra.
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inadequate to meet the total of their firm and personal obligations. 7
This will happen frequently by reason of the common practice of partners
of placing all or the greater portion of their wealth in their businesses.
The right of the firm creditor to reach firm assets would be reasonably
clear if partnerships arising from continuation agreements possessed legal
incidents similar to those of partnerships formed by voluntary inter vivos
changes. It is elementary partnership law that persons who extend credit
to a successor partnership formed in the latter way are able to reach firm
assets in an action at law and subject them to the payment of their
claims." It is entirely possible, though, that different consequences may
follow where the continuation agreement provides for the introduction
into the enterprise of a successor partner who is to take the place of a
decedent member in the interest of the latter's beneficiaries. Here there
is created a relationship between the successor partner and the benefi-
ciaries which resembles a pure trust relationship, with the beneficiaries
of the scheme comparable to the cestui que trust and the successor partner
comparable to a trustee of the dead member's interest.7"
While no cases have been found which directly hold that a typical
trust results in this situation, there are suggestions in the opinions which
point in this direction." Lindley apparently entertains this view, although
he is not satisfactorily explicit on the point.8 ' There is also authority
to the effect that an executor who continues the business of a sole trader
pursuant to the latter's testamentary direction becomes a trustee for the
decedent's beneficiaries.8 2 It may therefore be urged that, as a trust rela-
tionship results in the latter situation, a similar relationship results where
a continuation arrangement of the type under consideration goes into
effect after a partner's death. This question, however, is still open and
an answer should not be given by resort to superficially relevant analogies
or without a careful weighing of practical consequences.
Under trust law, creditors of a trustee who has incurred expenses
on behalf of his estate cannot reach the trust assets and subject them
77. Surviving partners are, of course, authorized to use assets of the continued
enterprise to pay properly incurred debts. Cf. Ferris v. Van Ingen & Co., 110 Ga. 102.
35 S. E. 347 (1900) ; Davis v. Christian, 15 Gratt. 11 (Va. 1859) ; see also Costello v. Cos-
tello, 209 N. Y. 252, 260, 103 N. E. 148, 151 (1913); Vincent v. Martin, 79 Ala. 540,
545 (1885).
78. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT §41; CRANE, PARTxERSHIP (1938) 386.
79. This would not be true, of course, where the successor partner is given or buys
the decedent's interest.
80. See In re Flavell, 25 Ch. D. 89, 93 (1883); Page v. Cox, 10 Hare 163, 163
(1851); Ehrmann v. Ehrmann, 72 L. T. 17 (1895).
81. LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (10th ed. 1935) 728, 730.
82. In re Evans, 56 L. T. 768 (1887); Dowse v. Gorton, [1891] A. C. 190; In re
Frith [1902] 1 Ch. D. 342; In re Johnson, 15 Ch. D. 548 (1880); Jacob, Trusts for Con-
tinuing a Decedent's Business (1932) 18 IowA L. REv. 43.
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to the payment of their claims in an action at law.$' Hence, if it should
be held that a continuation arrangement creates a trust relationship,
creditors of the continued firm would probably be unable to reach its
assets in an action at law.8 4 One result of such a view would be to force
creditors of the continued firm to work out their rights against the
latter's assets through the trustee's equitable right of exoneration. 8 This
would mean that the extent to which such creditors would be able to
reach the interest of the estate in the continued business would be reduced
by the amount which the trustee might be, indebted to it.8" A further
consequence would be to deprive creditors of the privilege of attaching
firm assets in actions against the continued firm.T
It seems unsound to make the rights of creditors depend upon the
state of accounts existing between the successor partner and the bene-
ficiaries of his activities. The growing policy of the law to subject entre-
preneur capital to the risks of the enterprise has manifested itself, among
other ways, in the enactment of employment insurance statutes and in
the development of the doctrine of respondeat superior and its marked
extension in workmen's compensation statutes.88 Where the usual type
of partnership or corporation is concerned, embarked capital is subject
in its entirety to the claims of creditors, and there seems to be no sound
reason why an exception should be made in the situation under considera-
83. 2 Scorr, TRUSTS (1939) 1499; Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates
for the Contracts and Torts of the Trustee (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 527.
84. It can, of course, be contended that the association of the surviving partner and
the designated successor for the purpose of continuing the enterprise results in the for-
mation of a new partnership having the usual partnership characteristics, and that new
creditors of the continued enterprise will therefore be entitled to be paid before any-
thing can be returned to the deceased partner's estate. This point of view seems to
assume the point at issue. The question is whether this type of situation is controlled
by the usual doctrines of partnership law or whether these doctrines are modified by a
trust relation.
85. In re Johnson, 15 Ch. D. 548 (1880) ; Hewitt v. Phelps, 105 U. S. 393 (1881)
2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) 1502.
86. In re Evans, 56 L. T. 768 (1887); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) 1510. The result
indicated in the text would not seem to differ if the enterprise were continued by a sole
surviving partner. If the trust point of view should prevail, the surviving partner, in-
stead of the successor, would be the trustee of the decedent's interest as well as absolute
vowner of his own interest.
87. Attachment may be invoked only in connection with a type of proceeding which
is historically known as a legal action. DRAKE, A-rrAcnMNrs (7th ed. 1891) § 9. Aboli-
tion of the formal distinction between law and equity in the code states does not change
this rule. POmEROY, CODE RIEZEIES (4th ed. 1904) § 37. But see Columbus Watch Co.
v. Hodenpyl, 135 N. Y. 430, 32 N. E. 239 (1892) (statement, where partnership was
continued under a will, that creditors of continued business possessed the usual rights of
partnership creditors).
88. Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the
Trustee (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 527.
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tion.89 An analogy is available to buttress the conclusion that a strict
trust relation should not be regarded as arising where this type of enter-
prise is concerned. Where one member of a typical partnership dies.
legal title to firm personalty vests in the survivors, 0 whose duty it is to
wind up the business, pay obligations of the firm, and distribute what
is left among those entitled. 1 Creditors of the old partnership may sue
the survivor in an action at law for unpaid debts, attach firm property
and subject it to the payment of their claims. 2 The survivors are not
regarded as trustees for the estate of the deceased partner despite the
fact that they hold legal title to firm personalty pending a winding up
of the business.9" Indeed, it has not only been said that the survivors
are not trustees in these circumstances, but that firm creditors have no
equitable remedy whatsoever against them so long as insolvency does
not intervene. 4 If surviving partners do not become strict trustees in
such circumstances under partnership law, it seems plausible to urge
that a successor partner who becomes such under an arrangement for
partnership continuation likewise should not be regarded as becoming
a trustee under partnership law.
B. Where claims are incurred prior to the death of a partner and
the enterprise is continued by the surviving partner in association with
a successor partner. There remains to be considered the manner in which
the continuation agreement may affect the rights of persons who become
partnership creditors before the death of a partner.05 Assets of both
89. Many cases seem tacitly to assume that the rights of creditors of the continued
firm are not contingent on the state of accounts between a successor partner and the
estate he represents. See cases cited in note 44 supra. Note, however, the statement in
Richter v. Poppenhusen, 39 How. Pr. 82 (Sup. Ct. 1870), aff'd, 42 N. Y. 373 (1870)
that creditors of the continued firm would be required to resort to equity in order to sub-
ject the assets of the continued enterprise to their claims. Even if this view prevails, it
would not necessarily follow that such creditors would be required to work out their
rights through the successor partner's right of exoneration.
90. Barry v. Briggs, 22 Mich. 201, 206 (1871); Butcher v. Hepworth, 115 N. Y.
328, 343, 22 N. E. 163 (1889). A partner's share in real property descends to his heirs
at common law and if it is necessary that the property be used to pay creditors, equity
will compel its conveyance. Shanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18 (1881).
91. CRAxE, PARTIsiiP (1938) 367.
92. Krueger v. Speith, 8 Mont. 482, 20 Pac. 664 (1889); cf. Costello v. Costello,
209 N. Y. 252, 193 N. E. 148 (1913).
93. Krueger v. Speith, 8 Mont. 482, 20 Pac. 664 (1889); Sheffield v. Key & Rials,
14 Ga. 537 (1854) ; see Roach v. Brannon, 57 Miss. 490, 499 (1879) ; 2 RowLEY, PAirr-
NFRSHIP (1916) § 835.
94. Roach v. Brannon, 57 Miss. 490, 500 (1879).
95. It is assumed that at the time of the death of a member, both partners and the
continued firm are solvent. Situations in which a transfer of a decedent's partner's in-
terest would work a fraud on the rights of prior creditors are outside the scope of this
article.
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the decedent's estate and the surviving partners are, of course, liable to
such creditors." The doubtful question concerns the rights of the latter
against the assets of the continued enterprise. Aside from the aspect
of technical legal procedure, this matter will be important chiefly where
the assets of the surviving partners become insufficient to pay their
obligations and when the time has expired for proof of claims against
the estate of the deceased partner. As an original proposition, it would
seem that such prior creditors should be able to reach and subject the
assets of the continued venture to the payment of their claims. Their
natural equities in such assets are as strong as those of persons who
become creditors of the new or continued firm, 7 and their position in
this respect is strengthened by the fact that the usual continuation agree-
ment clearly intends that the assets of the continued enterprise shall be
used to satisfy their claims as well as those of persons who become firm
creditors at a later date. But it cannot be asserted confidently that the
prior creditors will be able to reach the assets of the continued firm.
Definitive decisions are lacking, and the skein of the common law, as
it affects partnership creditors, is tangled and confusing.
It is clear, despite the existence of an agreement of continuance, that
the death of a partner necessarily results in a dissolution of the old
partnership, and, where it is carried on by the survivor in association with
a successor, in the formation of a new partnership. 8 This dissolution
96. 2 ROWLEY, PARTNERSHIP (1916) § 630.
Liability of the decedent partner's estate may sometimes raise an important prob-
lem with respect to the practicability of resorting to the use of the continuation agree-
ment. If firm creditors existing at the death of the partner should prove their claims
against the decedent's estate, payment of these claims would obviously deplete estate
assets then available for distribution. While the estate would be entitled to a pro rata
exoneration against the survivor, it is doubtful that it could require reimbursement prior
to the expiration of the continuation agreement. This conclusion is suggested by the
analogy that a partner cannot, without dissolving the firm, require payment of an obli-
gation owing to him by the firm before the end of the partnership term. GILMoRE, PART-
NERsHIP (1911) 504. Such a result might, of course, affect not only the amount that the
decedent's beneficiaries might ultimately receive from him, but also the time when dis-
tribution of the estate may be made.
97. This is also the view of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT, § 41.
98. There is disagreement, at least in the language of the decisions, as to whether
"dissolution" of a partnership results from the death of a partner where the enterprise is
thereafter continued pursuant to the provisions of a previous agreement or by testa-
mentary direction of the decedent member. One view regards the death of a partner as
necessarily causing a dissolution of the partnership and treats the continued firm as a
new partnership. Andrews v. Stinson, 254 Ill. 111, 124, 98 N. E. 222, 225 (1912) ; Ken-
nedy v. Porter, 109 N. Y. 526, 549, 17 N. E. 426, 434 (1888) ; Hornaday v. Cowgill, 54
Ind. App. 631, 639, 101 N. E. 1030, 1034 (1913) ; Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 331,
335, 31 Atl. 1080 (1895); PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP (4th ed. 1893) 433, 439. The other
view is that death does not cause a dissolution where there is an agreement for continua-
tion of the enterprise. See Evans v. Watts, 192 Pa. 112, 115. 43 Atl. 464 (1899) ; Kott-
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- may seriously affect the rights of persons who were creditors at the time
of dissolution. Its consequence may be illustrated by reference to an
analogous situation. A partnership may, for example, be dissolved vol-
untarily by agreement during the lifetime of its members and the enter-
prise continued either by some of the old members or by the old members
together with one or more new partners. Creditors of the old partner-
ship do hot in this situation become creditors of the new firm unless it
assumes their debts. 9 Where no such assumption occurs, creditors of
the old firm are unable to reach the assets of the continued enterprise."0
Where, however, such debts are assumed, those jurisdictions which recog-
nize third party beneficiary contracts permit creditors of the old firm to
reach and subject the assets of the continued firm to the payment of
their claims."'
On comparable reasoning, it would seem that creditors of the original
firm should be able to reach the assets of an enterprise which is con-
tinued after the death of a partner under authority of the partnership
contract. The clear intention of this type of continuation agreement is
that the assets of the continued firm shall be used to pay all its legitimate
debts, whether incurred before or after the death of a member.' A
third party beneficiary contract, which would permit such prior creditors
to reach the assets of the continued venture, seems to be implicit in these
arrangements. 10 3
witz v. Alexander's Ex'r, 34 Tex. 689, 712 (1869); Lincoln v. Orthwein, 120 Fed. 880,
883 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903); Parnell v. Thompson, 81 Kans. 119, 136, 105 Pac. 502, 503
(1909) ; Rand v. Wright, 141 Ind. 226, 233, 39 N. E. 447, 450 (1894). In Missouri both
views are entertained. Exchange Bank v. Tracy, 77 Mo. 594, 600 (1883) ; Edwards v.
Thomas, 66 Mo. 468, 481 (1877). This conflict of opinion is probably more apparent
than real. The cases which state that death dissolves a partnership assume as their major
premise that a change in the membership of a partnership necessarily results in the for-
mation of a new partnership. As the old firm no longer exists, it is natural to regard it
as dissolved. See Exchange Bank v. Tracy, supra at 600; Andrews v. Stinson, supra at
124. On the other hand, those courts which assert that death does not necessarily dis-
solve a partnership which is continued by agreement after the death of a member, prob-
ably mean only that in such circumstances death does not require winding up the enter-
prise. Certainly this is true of Leafs Appeal, 105 Pa. 505 (1884).
99. CRANE, PARTNERSH=, (1938) 386.
100. 1 Rowr.mv, PARTNERsHip (1916) § 559. All the former partners remain, of
course, personally liable for unpaid debts of the old firm. 1 RoWLEY, supra at § 558.
101. GUMoRE, PARTNERSHIP (1911) 248.
102. See note 77 supra.
103. This result, although not the reasoning, accords with the view expressed in
Costello v. Costello, 209 N. Y. 252, 260, 103 N. E. 148, 151 (1913). While the enter-
prise here concerned was continued after the death of a partner by testamentary author-
ity of the decedent member, no sufficient reason appears why a different result would be
reached where the enterprise was continued by agreement instead. See also Kilhoffer v.
Zeis, 109 Misc. 555, 568, 179 N. Y. S. 523, 530 (1919), aff'd, 196 App. Div. 922, 187
N. Y. Supp. 940 (4th Dep't 1921); In re Simpson, 9 Ch. 572 (1874). From the point of
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The foregoing discussion involves a consideration of what may be
loosely denominated as the substantive rights of prior creditors of the
continued enterprise. It does not deal with the forum in which such
rights may be asserted. This question will not arise in those jurisdictions
where the reformed procedure has been adopted, as all litigants seek
their remedies in the single integrated court which has replaced the old
dual system characterized by separate courts of law and equity.104 The
problem of the proper forum in which to maintain actions remains im-
portant, however, in those jurisdictions which still make a formal dis-
tinction between actions at law and suits in equity.105 In these latter juris-
dictions, creditors of the old firm would be unable to maintain a purely
legal action against the new firm where a successor partner, representing
the decedent's estate, has been introduced into the continued enterprise.
This is because a judgment at law in favor of the creditors, if the new
firm were sued and held liable, would bind the successor partner along
with the members of the old partnership. In the absence of an express
agreement by the successor partner, it would be unreasonable to assume
that he intended to become personally responsible for the earlier debts."'
And in the absence of such assumption by the successor, it would be
difficult to evolve a basis for making him personally liable. Hence, where
the reformed procedure does not obtain, prior creditors probably must
sue in equity in order to reach the firm assets.'
The partnership continuation agreement has interesting possibilities
which should not be overlooked by small entrepreneurs who desire both
to minimize taxes through the use of the partnership and to protect their
estates against the heavy financial losses frequently suffered through
view expressed in the text, such cases as Dowse v. Gorton, [1891] A. C. 190, and ER parle
Garland, 10 Ves. 110 (1804), have no relevancy with respect to the rights of creditors
of a business continued pursuant to the type of arrangement under consideration as they
do not involve enterprises continued under a contractual arrangement.
104. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 18. See also note 105 infra.
105. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is maintained in Ala-
bama, Arkansas, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, Tenues-
see and Vermont. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 20.
106. Compare Mattison v. Farnham, 44 Minn. 95, 46 N. W. 347 (1890).
107. The problem of the proper forum for suit also will arise where an agreement
of continuance contemplates that the enterprise shall be continued by the surviving part-
ner alone. In this situation, in contrast with that which involves a successor partner, the
reason is lacking for compelling prior creditors to work out their rights in equity. The
enterprise has no new member who has failed to assume its past obligations (see p.
206 supra). A surviving member of a typical partnership is liable in an action at law
for debts of the old firm. See note 96 supra. This also seems true in the situation under
consideration. There seems to be no reason why the continuation arrangement should
affect the forum in which such creditors may seek their remedy, assuming, of course,
that a strict trust does not result from the continuation arrangement. See p. 217 supra.
[Vol. 50: 202
1940] PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 223
the death of a partner. Where the arrangement is found adaptable to
the needs of particular entrepreneurs, it has obvious advantages over both
the small corporation and the partnership agreement which lacks a pro-
vision for its continuance. But the partnership continuation arrangement
has definite limitations as well as advantages. In each case its projected
use will require careful examination into the business and personal affairs
of the entrepreneurs concerned. Such factors as the individual business
abilities of the associates, the extent of their resources, and the income
requirements of their families will weigh in the final decision. It seems
probable, though, that many instances will develop in which the contin-
uation agreement will be found appropriate, and the obvious advantages
of this heretofore neglected partnership arrangement suggest that it is
likely to have a decided appeal to an increasingly large number of business
men.
